Lidé
Ing. Tomáš Votroubek
Všechny publikace
Separable Network Games with Compact Strategy Sets
- Autoři: doc. Ing. Tomáš Kroupa, Ph.D., Vannucci, S., Ing. Tomáš Votroubek,
- Publikace: Decision and Game Theory for Security. Basel: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2021. p. 37-56. LNCS. vol. 13061. ISSN 0302-9743. ISBN 978-3-030-90369-5.
- Rok: 2021
- DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3
- Odkaz: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3
- Pracoviště: Katedra počítačů, Centrum umělé inteligence
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Anotace:
A separable network game is a multiplayer finite strategic game in which each player interacts only with adjacent players in a simple undirected graph. The utility of each player results from the aggregation of utilities in the corresponding two-player games. In our contribution, we extend this model to infinite games whose strategy sets are compact subsets of the Euclidean space. We show that Nash equilibria of a zero-sum continuous network game can be characterized as optimal solutions to a specific infinite-dimensional linear optimization problem. In particular, when the utility functions are multivariate polynomials, this optimization formulation enables us to approximate the equilibria using a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations. We present a security game over a complete bipartite graph in which the nodes are attackers and defenders, who compete for control over given targets.